With growing popularity of cloud storage, the number of users of outsourcing data to cloud servers has increased dramatically. On the one hand, the rapidly increasing volume of data in the cloud is accompanied by a lot of data duplication. On the other hand, the cloud server stores only a unique copy of outsourced data in deduplication cloud storage system and the corruption or missing of the unique copy may bring immeasurable loss. Therefore, the file deduplication and integrity auditing are very important and how to securely and efficiently achieve them simultaneously needs to be settled urgently in academia and industry. In this paper, we propose a confidentiality-preserving deduplication cloud storage with public cloud auditing (CPDA). Firstly, our CPDA scheme achieves secure file deduplication on encrypted file, which supports public integrity auditing for the unique copy in the deduplication cloud storage system. Particularly, our CPDA scheme also realizes secure authentication tag deduplication. Secondly, our CPDA scheme utilizes the convergent encryption and random masking techniques to ensure data confidentiality during the file deduplication and integrity auditing process. Thirdly, our scheme not only supports each data owner to independently launch the integrity auditing of their own files, but also supports cloud server to periodically delegate the third party auditor to concurrently handle multiple auditing tasks to ensure the integrity of the outsourced files. Finally, the security of our scheme is formally proved and its performance is confirmed by numerical analyses and simulation experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is an indispensable branch of cloud computing, which allows data owners (DOs) to store their data in cloud servers and provides scalable, low-cost and powerful outsourcing storage services. Due to the advantages of cloud storage on costs and management, a growing number of individuals and organizations store their personal data to the cloud service providers (CSPs) in recent years [1] . However, this promising paradigm of data storage also faces many new challenges on the security and efficiency [2] .
The first concern is the efficiency of cloud storage. The volumes of cloud data are rapidly increasing and different The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zhigao Zheng . users often store the same data in the cloud, which leads to a lot of duplicated data in the cloud [3] , [4] . According to a survey from EMC, 75% of digital data are duplicated [5] recently. Hence, to save storage space and improve storage efficiency, cloud storage urgently needs effective deduplication techniques, that is, cloud sever only keeps a single copy for each duplicated file and the CSP only needs to provide the link to access the unique file for all the DOs who own the same file. Now the deduplication techniques roughly divide into two sorts: server-side deduplication and client-side deduplication. Server-side deduplication means the cloud server checks the duplication and performs the deduplication operation when receiving the outsourced file from clients (DOs). This method only saves the storage space on the server side. Client-side deduplication refers to that the client (DO) interacts with the cloud server to verify whether the outsourced file has been stored in the server before uploading the file. In case the outsourced file is duplicated, the client does not need to upload outsourcing file and can get access to the file stored in the cloud. Obviously, the client-side deduplication saves server storage, communication costs and network bandwidth, which benefits to both cloud server and clients [6] .
The second concern is the security of cloud storage. In a deduplication cloud storage system, the CSP stores only a unique copy of the same file. Storage hardware or software failure could result in this unique file copy to be damaged, potentially causing significant losses to the DOs and CSP [7] . Therefore, it is critical to ensure the integrity of the only copy of outsourced data for deduplication cloud storage systems. Whether outsourced data are intact and safely stored in the cloud server is the focus of DOs and CSPs [8] . Thus, it is very necessary for the deduplication cloud storage system to support the integrity auditing.
So far, an existing method of client-side deduplication is based on a static, short hash value (the hash value of the outsourced file) as the proof that the DO owns a file. However, this method is vulnerable to an attack: once the static hash value is accidentally leaked or obtained by a malicious user, the malicious user can prove to the CSP that he holds the whole file with the short hash value, so as to obtain the entire file from the CSP. That is to say, the leakage of a short hash value would lead to the leakage of an entire file to an outside adversary. Therefore, a cryptographic primitive called ''Proof of Ownership (POW)'' [9] is proposed to address such security vulnerability, which can efficiently and securely confirm that a DO holds an intact file before the CSP creating an access link to this file for the DO. Up to now, cloud data integrity auditing schemes fall into two categories: Proof of Data Possession (PDP) [10] and Proof of Retrievability (POR) [11] . PDP schemes allow a DO to verify the integrity of his data outsourced to the cloud. Compared with PDP, POR offers an extra property that DOs can actually ''recover'' the outsourced data. Recent researches enriched and extended their functions of these two kinds of schemes in different aspects [12] .
In order to achieve both security and efficiency of cloud storage, the file deduplication and public integrity auditing should be taken into account simultaneously. One intuitive method is to directly combine an existing PDP/POR scheme with a POW scheme. However, this method will impose a huge O(Wn) storage overheads for each file to the CSP, where W is the number of owners of a file and n is the total number of data blocks in this file [13] . Further, since each DO separately generates his own authentication tags and uploads these tags to the CSP for integrity auditing. Thus, the CSP is required to store all the DOs' authentication tags for the same file, which is another type of duplication and redundancy. Therefore, in order to save more storage space, it is best to ensure both the file deduplication and authentication tags deduplication in deduplication cloud storage system supporting public cloud auditing.
In addition, motivated by the fact more and more DOs encrypt their outsourced data for confidentiality, secure deduplication with integrity auditing on encrypted data is also a very important practical requirement [14] .
A. RELATED WORK
In recent years, much of the growing interest has been pursued in file deduplication, data integrity auditing and the combination of both. We will review the related work in the following.
1) SECURE DEDUPLICATION
Previously, Dropbox applied an existing deduplication method [15] , [16] , in which the hash value of the file is treated as a proof that a user owns this file. Unfortunately, the CSP may provide access links to the file for malicious users with the correct hash value, which means the leakage of a short hash value would lead to leakage of an entire file to an outside adversary. In other words, such deduplication method has critical security vulnerability [6] . In order to fix this issue, Halevi et al. presented a promising protocol named ''Proof of Ownership (POW)'' [9] , in which a user can efficiently prove to the CSP that he exactly holds this intact file. Pietro et al. proposed an improved POW scheme [17] such that it has constant computation costs. Nevertheless, both above POW schemes do not consider the confidentiality of duplicated files. Later, DOs start to encrypt outsourced files to protect their confidentiality. However, because of the different encryption algorithms and keys, different owners will produce different ciphertexts for the same file, which makes CSP have to store all the different ciphertexts. Therefore, the deduplication on encrypted data is a tough problem. Ng et al. first introduced the privacyprotection into the file deduplication scheme [18] . Dourceur et al. introduced a cryptographic primitive called ''Convergent Encryption'' to address such data confidentiality in deduplication [19] . Keelveedhi et al. explored the DupLESS system as a practical implementation of convergent encryption in secure deduplication [14] . Li et al. utilized the keydisperse method to manage content-based keys in convergent encryption [20] .
2) INTEGRITY AUDITING
Ateniese et al. [10] , [21] first proposed a public cloud auditing scheme named ''Provable Data Possession (PDP)'', which utilizes RSA-based homomorphic tags and randomly samples a few data blocks to verify the data integrity. This scheme not only ensures that the CSP possesses the intact target files without downloading the whole file, but also reduces the DOs' workload by introducing the TPA. After Ateniese et al.'s work [10] , many public cloud auditing schemes begin to consider some vital and practical requirements such as dynamics, privacy-preserving, batch auditing and so on. Ateniese et al. first proposed a dynamic provable data possession scheme based on their prior PDP scheme [22] , but it fails to support the insertion operation. Wang et al. [2] and Erway et al. [23] respectively presented two different fully dynamic PDP schemes by using different data structures (the skip list or the merkle hash tree). Later, by combining the random masking, Wang et al. extended their scheme to be privacy-preserving [24] , which can ensure that the TPA cannot obtain any detailed content of outsourced files. Nevertheless, these above proposals in [2] , [22] - [24] suffer from a huge of communication and computation overheads. To reduce overheads, Tian et al. designed a dynamic public auditing scheme [7] , which is efficient and privacypreserving and supports batch updating. Juels et al. presented a proof of retrievability scheme [11] , which not only can check if the CSP possesses the intact target file, but also can guarantees their data retrievability by using erasure code. Shacham [26] , which has full security proofs followed the security model defined in [11] and achieves public auditing with constant communication costs.
3) SECURE DEDUPLICATION AND CLOUD AUDITING
To achieve both file deduplication and integrity auditing simultaneously, Zheng et al. proposed a proof of storage with deduplication (POSD) scheme [12] which explored the PDP/POR scheme to achieve POW. However, since the DOs have limited computation and constrained bandwidth resources, they cannot afford the huge communication and computation overheads which are linear to the number of challenged blocks and the number of segments in each block. Yuan et al. utilized the polynomial-based authentication tags and homomorphic authenticators to design a novel public cloud auditing with deduplication (PCAD) scheme [13] , which reduced the storage overheads of the authentication tags by aggregating the tags of the same file from different DOs, and thus it achieved authentication tags deduplication. Unfortunately, the PCAD scheme cannot support the deduplication on encrypted data. Li et al. presented a secure auditing and deduplication data (SADD) scheme [27] which is distinguished from the PCAD scheme, because it additionally considered to outsource the computation of tags generation to the MapReduce cloud auditor and achieved the public auditing and deduplication on the encrypted data. Nevertheless, this SADD scheme is constructed based on the Merkel Hash Tree (MHT), and hence it needs heavy communication and computation costs during the POW and integrity verification processes. Li and Liu proposed a privacy-preserving public cloud auditing scheme supporting data deduplication (P-PCAD) [28] , in which the bloom filter is utilized to check if the user exactly owns a claimed file or not. The P-PCAD scheme is proved to be unforgeable and uncheatable in public auditing and deduplication processes.
It is a pity that the CSP needs to store all authentication tags of the same file from different DOs which inevitably results in huge storage overheads for the CSP.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Based on the existing excellent work, we try to propose a confidentiality-preserving deduplication cloud storage with public cloud auditing in this paper. More precisely, our contributions can be summarized as following:
1) A novel confidentiality-preserving deduplication cloud storage scheme supporting public cloud auditing (CPDA) is proposed, which simultaneously supports secure file deduplication on encrypted files and authentication tags deduplication, i.e., the CSP keeps only a single copy and one set of authentication tags for each file in the cloud. This scheme also provides the public integrity verification of the unique file in deduplication cloud storage by using cloud auditing technology. 2) Our CPDA scheme realizes the deduplication on encrypted files by introducing the convergent encryption technique which guarantees the same plaintext file can produce the same ciphertext. Thus, the CSP and TPA cannot obtain any actual content of DOs' file during the process of deduplication and public auditing and the confidentiality of the outsourced data is guaranteed. 3) Our CPDA scheme not only supports each DO to independently delegate the integrity auditing of their own files to the TPA, but also supports CSP to periodically delegate TPA to concurrently handle multiple auditing tasks to ensure the integrity of outsourced files. 4) The performance comparisons between the CPDA scheme with the state-of-the-art schemes are given by numerical analyses and simulation experiments. The results show that our CPDA scheme is comprehensively efficient and can support all the given functions in a more effective way, as shown in Tabel 1. The security of the CPDA scheme also is formally proven.
The remaining of this paper is organized as following. In Section II, the system model and some preliminaries and intractability assumptions which our scheme based on are described. In Section III, confidentiality-preserving deduplication cloud storage supporting public cloud auditing and its extension to support batch auditing are proposed. The security of our scheme is proved in Section IV. In Section V, the performance of communication, computation and storage costs of the CPDA scheme is sufficiently evaluated. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND INTRACTABILITY ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we first describe the system model, then some cryptographic tools and intractability assumptions applied in our scheme are presented. 
A. SYSTEM MODEL
Generally, a file deduplication system supporting public cloud auditing consists of four major entities:
Key Generation Center (KGC): A KGC is an entity who is responsible for initializing the system parameters and generating the part of the public keys.
Data Owner (DO): An entity, who has a great quantity of data to be stored in the cloud servers, can be either an individual or an organization. Since there may be multiple DOs who possess the same file in the cloud, the DOs of the same file are divided into the original DO (only one) and the subsequent DOs (maybe more than one) according to the order of uploading file.
Cloud Service Provider (CSP): An entity, who has significant storage space and computation resource to provide data storage and secure deduplication service for the DO.
Third Party Auditor (TPA): An entity, who is trusted by DOs, has expertise and capabilities to verify the integrity of the outsourced file.
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the KGC first chooses a seed and sends it to DOs by secure channels, and then the DOs generate the convergent key based on the outsourced file and the seed. Then, DOs encrypt the outsourced file and generate corresponding block signatures. If there is no the same file in the CSP, the original DO uploads the ciphertexts of the file and their signatures to the CSP; otherwise, the subsequent DOs of the file perform POW protocol with the CSP. If the subsequent DOs pass the POW protocol, they are provided an access link to the file stored in the cloud, and uploads their own signatures to the CSP. Furthermore, the TPA will perform the integrity auditing with the CSP upon the auditing requests from DOs. Finally, the TPA responds the auditing results to DOs.
B. BILINEAR PAIRING
A bilinear pairing is a map e : G × G → G T with bilinearity, nondegeneracy and computability, where G and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of a large prime order p and bilinearity means that: for ∀g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ G and ∀x, y ∈ Z * p , e(g 1 x , g 2 y ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) xy , and e(g 1 , g 2 ) · e(g 1 , g 3 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 · g 3 ) = e(g 2 · g 3 , g 1 ).
C. CONVERGENT ENCRYPTION
Convergent encryption is a new technique. Since the encryption keys of convergent encryption only rely on the file itself and do not change with different encryption executors, in other words, different users produce the same file tags and ciphertext for the same file, so convergent encryption is very suitable for ciphertext deduplication [19] , [29] . A file owner derives a convergent key and a file tag from the file itself, where the convergent key will be used to encrypt the file and the file tag mainly be used to identify the file in the deduplication test. Formally, a convergent encryption scheme can be defined with four algorithms:
The key generation algorithm takes a security parameter 1 λ and a file F as inputs and outputs the convergent key K F of F;
Enc(K F , F) → C F . The encryption algorithm takes the convergent key K F and file F as inputs and outputs the ciphertext C F of file F;
The decryption algorithm takes the convergent key K F and ciphertext C F as inputs and outputs the plaintext of file F; TagGen(F) → Tag F . The tag generation algorithm takes a file F as input and outputs a file tag Tag F of file F.
D. PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
Proof of Ownership (POW) is an interactive protocol running between the CSP (the verifier) and a DO (the prover) [6] , [9] , by which a DO can convince the CSP that he/she indeed owns a claimed file which has been stored in the CSP. As mentioned above, POW is necessary for the client-deduplication. The formulation of POW in [6] is described below.
Sum(F, 1 λ ) → sum F . The randomized summary function takes a file F and the security parameter 1 λ as inputs, and outputs a short summary value sum F , where the bit-length of sum F is short and independents on file size |F|.
ChalGen(n, d) → chal. The challenge algorithm takes the block number n of file F and the sample size d as inputs, and outputs a sample set chal ⊂ [1, n] with |chal| = d.
ProofGen(F, chal) → P. This proof generation algorithm is run by a prover to generate an ownership proof of the file F. It takes a collection of file blocks and a challenge set chal as inputs, and outputs an ownership proof of the file F. ProofCheck(P, sum F , chal) → Accept/Reject. This proof check algorithm is run by the verifier to verify that whether the prover indeed holds an intact file F. It takes a challenge set chal, a proof P and the summary value sum F as inputs, then outputs either Accept or Reject.
E. HOMOMORPHIC VERIFIABLE AUTHENTICATOR
Homomorphic Verifiable Authenticator (HVA) is widely employed in public auditing [2] , [10] , [23] , [24] , which allows a public auditor to verify the integrity of file stored in the cloud without accessing or downloading the original file. Since digital signatures (such as RSA-based signature and BLS-based signature) are usually used to generate HVAs, HVAs can be considered as homomorphic verifiable signatures. Under the premise of the same security strength, a BLS-based signature (160 bits) is much shorter than an RSA-based signature (1024 bits) [2] . Therefore, BLS-based homomorphic verifiable authenticators (BLS-HVA) are more popular in the recent public cloud auditing schemes [2] . Generally, taking a data block m for example, the BLS-HVA can be generated by using the following steps: Given a secret key α and a pair of public key g, y ∈ G, where y = g α . The BLS-HVA (denoted by σ ) for block m can be computed by σ = (H (m)) α , where H : {0, 1} * → G is a hash function. Finally, the TPA can verify the integrity of block m through checking whether e(H (m), y) = e(σ, g) holds.
F. INTRACTABILITY ASSUMPTIONS
The security of our proposed scheme is based on the following intractability assumptions.
Defination 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem): Given g, g a , g b ∈ G, to compute g ab , where G is a multiplicative cyclic group of a large prime order p and a, b ∈ Z * p are unknown.
Defination 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption):
For any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the probability of solving the CDH problem is negligible, namely,
G is a multiplicative cyclic group of a large prime order p with a generator g.
Defination 4 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption): For any PPT adversary A, the probability of solving the DL problem is negligible, namely,
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, our CPDA scheme is given in detail firstly. Then, it is extended to support the batch auditing, and other advantages of our scheme are discussed finally.
A. CONFIDENTIALITY-PRESERVING DEDUPLICATION AND PUBLIC CLOUD AUDITING
As shown in Fig. 2 , our proposed scheme involves three phases: setup, storage and auditing phases. To be specific, the Setup Phase is mainly about establishing system parameters and generating keys for DOs. The Storage Phase is the file deduplication storage process that involves two cases: Case 1 is the original DO of the file storing the ciphertext of the original file; Case 2 is that the subsequent DOs interacts with the CSP for file deduplication storage. The Auditing Phase is to conduct integrity auditing on the unique copy of file in the deduplication cloud storage system, enabling each DO to independently audit the integrity of his own file at any time. Setup Phase: This phase consists of the following two steps. is an extractor used to extract a key that is determined by the content of the file, and (n, k)RSC is a Reed-Solomon code.
• Step 2 (Key Generation): The KGC first picks two random elements g, u ∈ G and make them public. Then, the KGC randomly picks a seed s and secretly sends it to legitimate DOs. Each data owner DO t chooses a random value a t ∈ Z * p and sets y t ← g a t , and generates a pair of secret and public keys (sk t , pk t ) for signature, and then each DO t makes (y t , pk t ) public and keeps (a t , sk t ) secret. Storage Phase: In order to achieve both secure clientside deduplication and integrity auditing, the storage phase of our CPDA scheme is different from those of traditional auditing schemes. Specifically, our CPDA scheme has two different file uploading processes for the original owner and subsequent owners.
Case 1: File uploading for the original owner of file F When the file F is not stored in the CSP, the first uploader of file F is considered as the original owner DO 0 . Thus, the file uploading procedure for the original owner DO 0 is given in the following. Secondly, the DO 0 encrypts the file F with the symmetric key K F to get C F = Enc(F, K F ). Finally, the DO 0 applies the Reed-Solomon code (n, k)RSC on C F to obtain C F = {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n } such that C F can be completely recovered from any k blocks among {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n }. The purpose of using Reed-solomon codes to encode C F is to improve the fault tolerance of the deduplication cloud storage system. 
where Sign sk 0 (Tag F n) is used to ensure the integrity of the file tag Tag F . Then, the DO 0 uploads the file set C F = {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n }, the signatures set 0 = {σ 0 1 , σ 0 2 , · · · , σ 0 n } and the file identifier ID 0 F to the CSP. VOLUME 7, 2019 • Step 5 (Authentication Tags Generation): For each encrypted block C i , the CSP further generates an authentication tag θ i as θ i = θ 0 i = e(σ 0 i , y 0 ), i = 1, 2, · · · , n based on the signatures 0 = {σ 0 1 , σ 0 2 , · · · , σ 0 n }. At last, the CSP should store the authentication tags = {θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ n }. Case 2: File uploading for the subsequent owners of file F Suppose a DO claims that he has a file F and wants to store it in the CSP. When the file F has stored in the CSP, this data owner needs to show the proof that he owns the same intact file F. If the POW is valid, he will be regarded as a legal subsequent owner of file F and denoted by DO t (t = 1, 2, · · · , W ). Thus, the file uploading procedure for a subsequent owner DO t of file F is described as follows. The CSP runs the deduplication test. If there is a duplicate, the CSP will perform proof of ownership protocol with the DO t .
• Step 3 (Key Extraction and File Encryption and Split):
Firstly, the DO t compute encryption key K F = Extractor(F; s) based his file F. Secondly, the DO t encrypts the file F as C F = Enc(F, K F ). Finally, the DO t applies the Reed-Solomon code (n, k)RSC on C F to obtain C F = {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n } such that C F can be completely recovered from any k blocks among C F . 2) Ownership Proof Generation: For each block C i , the DO t generates a signature σ t i with the public key u and his secret key a t , which is described as
Upon receiving the chal from the CSP, the DO t would produce an ownership proof, which consists of the signature proof and the data proof. The signature proof σ t is essentially the signature aggregation of the challenged blocks, i.e., σ t = i∈D (σ t i ) v i . And the data proof is essentially the linear combination of sampled blocks, i.e., µ = i∈D v i C i . Finally, the DO t responds the CSP with P POW = (σ t , µ).
3) POW Proof Check: Upon receiving the proof P POW = (σ t , µ), the CSP computes
and verifies the ownership proof by checking the following (2):
where {θ i } i∈ [1,n] are the authentication tags stored in the CSP. If (1) holds, it outputs Accept and an access link to the file F will be established for the DO t ; otherwise, Reject.
• Step 5 (Signature Uploading): When the proof of ownership are accepted, the DO t uploads the signature set t = {σ t 1 , σ t 2 , · · · , σ t n } and the file identifier ID t F = Tag F n Sign sk t (Tag F n) to the CSP, and secretly saves the convergent key K F and the access link in his local storage. After that, the DO t deletes the file F and t from his local storage.
• Step 6 (Authentication Tags Updating): Upon receiving the signature set t = {σ t 1 , σ t 2 , · · · , σ t n } from the DO t , the CSP computes θ t i = e(σ t i , g) and then updates the authentication tags θ i as θ i ← θ i · θ t i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. At last, the CSP stores the updated tags = {θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ n }. Auditing Phase: In a deduplication cloud storage system, the CSP stores only a unique copy of the same file. Storage hardware or software failure may damage the integrity of a unique file copy. Therefore, the DOs need to determine the integrity of their outsourced file in any time. Generally, limited by the computation power or constrained resources, the DOs may entrust a TPA to conduct separate integrity auditing for file F. Suppose a DO t (t = 0, 1, · · · , W ) delegate a TPA to do the following steps. For clarity, assume there are W +1 (the number can freely and dynamically increase) DOs for the file F. 
Then, the CSP computes the linear combination of sampled blocks and aggregates all DOs' public keys except the DO t 's public key as follows:
The data proofs are composed of 1 and 2 , where
Finally, the CSP sends P = ( , 1 , 2 ) to the TPA as the integrity proof.
3) Integrity Proof Check: Upon receiving the integrity proof P, the TPA first computes the aggregate value of public keys except the DO t 's public key:
Further, the TPA performs the integrity verification by checking (7):
If (7) holds, it outputs Ture; otherwise, outputs False. The correctness of (2) and (7) can be demonstrated by the following (8) , as shown at the bottom of this page, and (9), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
B. BATCH AUDITING
As mentioned above, in a deduplication cloud storage system, the CSP stores only a unique copy of the same file. Storage hardware or software failures may result in this unique file copy to be damaged, which potentially causes bad reputation or economic loss to the CSP. Therefore, the CSP should periodically delegate the TPA to batch audit the integrity of outsourced files. For the sake of description, assume that the TPA concurrently audits k files {F 1 , F 2 , · · · , F k } and each file F i has W i + 1 DOs. 1) Challenge Generation: For each file F i (i = 1, 2, · · · , k), the TPA randomly picks c-element subset I i = {s i,j |j = 1, 2, · · · , c} from set [1, n] and random number set i = {w i,j ∈ Z * p | j ∈ I i }. The TPA choose a data owner DO i t for each file F i and calculates random masking based on the DO i t 's public key as R i ← (y i t ) r , i = 1, 2, · · · , k, where r ∈ Z * p is a random number. And then, the TPA sends the challenge message chal = ({j, w j } j∈I i , R i |i = 1, 2, · · · , k) to the CSP.
2) Integrity Proof Generation: Upon receiving the challenge from the TPA, the CSP would produce the tag proof i and the data proofs ( i 1 , i 2 ) for each file F i as follows:
Then, the TPA aggregates the tag proofs and the data proofs respectively as follows:
Finally, the CSP sends P B = ( B , B 1 , B 2 ) to the TPA as the batch verification proof.
3) Proof Check: After receiving P B , the TPA first respectively computes the aggregated public keys of all owners of each file F i except DO i t :
Further, the TPA performs the batch integrity verification by checking (10):
If (10) holds, it outputs Ture; otherwise, outputs False. The correctness of (10) can be demonstrated by the following (11) , as shown at the bottom of the page 10.
C. FUNCTIONAL DISCUSSION
So far, we have presented the detailed process of our CPDA scheme and its batch auditing. In this section, we will furthermore discuss our other design considerations.
(1)Secure deduplication:
• File deduplication: In our scheme, the client-side file deduplication can be implemented securely. Specifically, the CSP will firstly run the deduplication test when receiving the file tag Tag F from a DO. If there is no a Tag F in the cloud, the user uploads the file, and CSP adds Tag F in its list of file tags. Otherwise, the CSP have a duplicate already and the user performs the POW protocol with the CSP. If it is passed, this user is authorized to access this stored file without uploading the file. Thus, the client-side file deduplication will save storage costs and communication costs.
• Authentication tag deduplication: The traditional way of realizing data integrity verification is the CSP stores all the authentication tags generated by all DOs for all blocks of file, even that file is duplicated, which over time puts a large storage pressure O(Wn) on the CSP. Different from the above methods, our CPDA scheme migrates the computation of authentication tags to CSP and then the CSP can aggregate tags for the same block, in other words, the CSP only needs to store a set {θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ n } for authentication tags, in which there are only n elements. Concretely, each authentication tag θ i is aggregated as:
i , y 0 y 1 · · · y W ), i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Therefore, our CPDA scheme can reduce the storage overheads of the CSP about authentication tags from O(Wn) to O(n).
(2)Data confidentiality: We take advantage of the idea of convergent encryption to realize the ''content identified'' and deterministic encryption [27] , which not only ensures data confidentiality to the CSP, but also realizes the deduplication of encrypted data. In addition, to further prevent privacy leakage against the TPA, in the process of generating the data proofs ( 1 , 2 ), the CSP would blind the linear combination C of sampled blocks with TPA's random masking R and the DO's public key. Although the TPA knows ( 1 , 2 ), R and DO's public key, it is computationally infeasible for TPA to obtain the private content of DOs' data under the DL hardness assumption.
(3)Random sampling: In the following, we will explain why the TPA or CSP randomly selects c or d blocks for a challenge from the whole n blocks of file F in the integrity auditing or the POW process. In fact, it is inefficient and inadvisable to challenge all blocks for checking the integrity and correctness of the file because there are the huge amounts of outsourced data in the cloud. Instead, the random sampling method is more affordable and practical for detecting the misbehavior of the CSP or the dishonesty of the user. The previous studies [2] , [10] , [24] have demonstrated the rationality and feasibility of this method. Generally, assume ρ is the proportion of corrupted blocks, P is the detection probability for the misbehavior of the CSP or the user, and c is the number of challenged blocks, then the relationship of these three values satisfies the equation P = 1 − (1 − ρ) c . Therefore, the number of challenged blocks c depends on the proportion of corrupted blocks ρ and the detection probability P. For example, when there are 1% corrupted blocks in the
CSP or the malicious user, the TPA or CSP only needs to challenge 459 blocks to detect the corrupted blocks with the probability 99%.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSES
In this section, the security model is described as follows and the security of our CPDA scheme will be evaluated.
A. SECURITY MODEL
Generally, the TPA is assumed to be honest but curious, which means the TPA performs the auditing process honestly, but it is curious about the outsourced file. Moreover, the CSP could be dishonest in the integrity auditing and may forge the auditing proof to deceive the TPA. Additionally, there may be a malicious user who knows the partial file and convinces the CSP that he owns the entire file. Therefore, the security model of our CPDA scheme is defined from the perspectives of integrity auditing and POW. First, our CPDA scheme is required to be CSP-unforgeable in the integrity auditing process according to the scheme in [10] . Second, CPDA scheme is required to be (k, θ)-uncheatable in the POW process according to the security definition in [9] .
CSP-unforgeable:
A CPDA scheme is CSP-unforgeable if no dishonest CSP can successfully forge the auditing proof to deceive the TPA with a non-negligible probability.
(k, θ)-uncheatable: A CPDA scheme is (k, θ)-uncheatable if given a file F with min-entropy k, no malicious user, who knows partial file containing θ-bit Shannon entropy of F, convinces the CSP that he has the entire file F with a nonnegligible probability.
B. SECURITY PROOF
According to the security model described above, in this section, our CPDA scheme is proved to be CSP-unforgeable in Theorem 1 and 2, and be (k, θ)-uncheatable in Theorem 3.
Theorem 1 (Unforgeability of BLS-HVAs): For any adversary, it is computationally infeasible to forge an HVA under BLS signature scheme, if the intractability assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem holds in group G.
Proof: According to Section II.E, HVAs can be considered as homomorphic verifiable signatures. In our CPDA scheme, the HVA is a BLS-based signature. Thus, the following game is designed according to the security model of the BLS signature scheme [30] . Suppose the CSP is an adversary who can forge a valid HVA which can pass the TPA's verification, then a challenger C can be constructed who can solve a CDH problem instance. We will show how C uses the adversary as a subroutine to solve a CDH instance below.
Setup. Given a CDH instance (g, g a , g b ) over group G, C sets y = g a as the his signing public key for HVA and he does not know the signing secret key a.
Hash-Query. The adversary CSP makes at most q H * hash queries in this phase and C keeps a hash list L h . If (i, C i ) is already in L h , C returns the same answer from the list L h .
Otherwise, C randomly chooses w i ∈ Z * p and flips a coin c i ∈ {0, 1}, where Pr[c i = 1] = δ and Pr[c i = 0] = 1 − δ, then sets H * i as
Then C responds this query with H * i and adds (i, (i,
The adversary CSP makes signature queries in this phase. For a signature query on (i, C i ), C finds tuple (i, (i, C i ), w i , c i , H * i ) from L h . If c i = 1, C aborts the response. Otherwise, C computes σ as σ = (g a ) w i . Because the following equation obviously holds according to above simulation.
Obviously, σ is a valid signature on (i, C i ). Forgery. Suppose the adversary CSP forges signature σ on (i , C i ) with the probability ε, where the signature on (i , C i ) has not been queried. C finds tuple
According to the signature definition, we have
as the solution to the given CDH instance (g, g a , g b ).
Specially, C solve the given CDH instance with probability ε · δ(1 − δ).
The above shows that, if CSP can successfully forge a signature with the probability ε, then C can solve a given CDH instance with the probability ε · δ(1 − δ), which is contradict with the intractability assumption of the CDH problem. So, it is computationally infeasible to successfully forge a valid BLS-HVA in our CPDA scheme by the CSP.
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability of the Integrity Auditing Proof): In our scheme, it is computationally infeasible for the CSP to forge an integrity auditing proof which meets the verification equation (7) .
Proof: We design the following game according to the security model in [10] , [25] . The TPA sends a challenge chal = ({i, w i } i∈I , R) to the CSP. Suppose the valid auditing proof on the correct file F should be P = ( , 1 , 2 ), where 1 = e(u, R) C , 2 = e(u, Y ) C , C = i∈I ϑ i and ϑ i = w i · C i . However, according to Theorem 1, the CSP cannot forge a valid HVA , so the CSP forges a proof on an incorrect file F as P = ( , 1 , 2 ), where F = F, 1 = e(u, R) C , 2 = e(u, Y ) C , C = i∈I ϑ i , and ϑ i = w i · C i . Define ϑ i = ϑ i − ϑ i for i ∈ I , and at least one element of { ϑ i } i∈I is nonzero. If this forged proof P can still pass the verification performed by the TPA, then the CSP wins the game; otherwise, it fails.
Assume that the CSP wins the game, then, according to (7) , we have
Moreover, P = ( , 1 , 2 ) is the correct proof, so we have
According to the properties of bilinear pairing, we can learn that
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group with a large prime order p, then for two elements h 1 , h 2 ∈ G, ∃x ∈ Z * p such that h 2 = h 1
x . Moreover, given h 1 and h 2 , u can be generated as u = h 1 α h 2 β ∈ G, where α and β are random values belonging to Z * p . Accordingly, we have
Obviously, for the given h 1 , h 2 ∈ G, h 2 = h 1 x , we can find a solution for the DL problem x = −α/β unless i∈I ϑ i = 0 or β = 0. However, as defined above, at least one of element in { ϑ i } i∈I is nonzero, and β is a random element in Z * p , which means that the probability of β being equal to 0 is 1/p. Therefore, we can find a solution for the DL problem with a non-negligible probability 1 − 1/p, which contradicts with the DL assumption.
Theorem 3 ((k, θ)-Uncheatable): The CPDA scheme is (k, θ)-uncheatable with respect to challenge of d = n θ −k log(2 θ −k + ε) blocks in the POW process, where k is the min-entropy of the file F, θ is the amount of entropy leaked to or stolen by the malicious user, and ε is negligible.
Proof: The game about uncheatability of the POW is defined as follows. First, the CSP sends a challenge chal = {i, v i } i∈D to the malicious user DO t . Then DO t , who only knows partial file containing θ -bit Shannon entropy of F, sends back an ownership proof P POW = (σ t , µ ). If this ownership proof can still pass the CSP's verification equation (2), the malicious user DO t wins the game; otherwise, he fails.
The left of (2) can be rewritten as follows.
According to Theorem 1, the HVAs are unforgeable, thus the authentication tags {θ i } i∈ [1,n] are unforgeable. Further, the right of (2) can be developed to
Therefore, in order to make (2) hold, we have
That is, the malicious user must obtain all the file ciphertext C F . In other words, the malicious user is able to win the game only if he can get the entropy of unknown bits in challenge blocks.
Let Win be the event that the malicious user successfully guesses the unknown bits in the challenged d blocks. Without loss of generality, assume that the unknown bits uniformly distribute over the n blocks of the file F. Therefore, the probability is
In general, k − θ ≥ λ (1 λ is security parameter) because the sizes of data files are large. Thus, the probability Pr[Win] that the malicious user cheats the CSP is negligible.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Numerically analyses and simulation experiments on the communication, computation and storage costs of our CPDA scheme are conducted in this section. Then, we give the comprehensive performance comparisons between our CPDA scheme with the current related schemes [12] , [13] , [27] , [28] , all of which realize deduplication with the public cloud auditing. For the sake of fairness of comparison, assume that the size of original file F in all schemes is equal, the communication costs of uploading F and its identifier and the storage costs of storing F are not considered for all schemes in the numerical and experimental analyses.
All the experiments are implemented by using the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) Library and Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library and run at Windows 7 with a 3.60 GHz Intel Core i7-4790 CPU and 8 GB memory. Set the security parameter λ be 160 bits, and all experimental results represent the mean of 100 trials in our experiments.
For simplicity, the notations used in the following are given in Table 2 . 
A. COMMUNICATION COSTS
In our CPDA scheme, the communication costs in storage phase mainly consist of the signatures t = {σ t 1 , σ t 2 , · · · , σ t n }, the challenge chal = {i, v i } i∈D and the ownership proof P POW = (σ t , µ). First, to ensure each DO can audit the integrity of file separately, any owner needs to respectively upload his n signatures t = {σ t 1 , σ t 2 , · · · , σ t n } to the CSP, and the size of t is n|G|. Second, the chal consists of d numbers in [1, n] and d random numbers in Z * p , then the size of chal is d|n| + d|p|. Third, the DO needs to send the proof P POW = (σ t , µ) to the CSP to prove that he actually holds the whole file, which is respectively composed of two elements in G and Z * p , thus the size of P POW is a constant. The communication costs of the auditing phase in CPDA scheme depend on the size of challenge chal = ({i, w i } i∈I , R) and integrity auditing proof P = ( , 1 , 2 ). The chal in integrity auditing consists of c numbers in [1, n] , c random numbers in Z * p and a group element in G, then the size of challenge message chal is c|n| + c|p| + |G|. The integrity auditing proof P = ( , 1 , 2 ) is composed of three group elements in G T , obviously the size of P is a constant. Therefore, the total communication costs of auditing process in our CPDA scheme are c|n| + c|p| + |G| + 3|G T |.
Next, we will compare our CPDA scheme with existing scheme [12] , [13] , [27] , [28] about the communication costs in storage phase and auditing phase, and the results are shown in Table 3 , Table 4 and Fig. 3 . In the POSD scheme in [12] , each subsequent owner does not need to upload the authentication tags, because this scheme audits the integrity of file F by using the authentication tags uploaded by the original owner. However, the original owner needs heavy communication costs in storage phase and it is not able to ensure that each owner can audit the integrity of file F separately. In the SADD scheme in [27] , the DOs need to upload the whole file F to the TPA, and then the TPA generates the authentication tags by his own secret key, finally the TPA stores the authentication tags along with the file F in the CSP. Thus, the file F (with large size) will be transferred twice in storage process, which increase the whole communication costs and is inefficient. Moreover, due to the MHT structure, communicational cost of auditing phase in the SADD scheme is highest in five schemes. Although the P-PCAD scheme in [28] can ensure that each owner audits the integrity of file F separately, the CSP needs to store all authentication tags from all owners of file F, which results in heavy storage overheads for the CSP (in detail at Section V.C). In the PCAD scheme in [13] , the communication costs during the auditing phase is minimal, however, our CPDA scheme requires a smaller proof with constant size than the PCAD scheme. And the PCAD scheme does not support secure deduplication on encrypted file. In general, our CPDA scheme is comprehensively more efficient in communication costs during storage and auditing phases.
B. COMPUTATION COSTS
As described in Section III.A, our CPDA scheme consists of three phases: Setup phase, Storage phase and Auditing phase. Among these phases, we mainly evaluate the computation costs in storage and auditing phase, in which each entity produces a large amount of computational overheads and system setup usually only initiates once. The computation costs in storage phase mainly stem from the DOs generating the signatures, the CSP computing the authentication tags, the DO generating the ownership proof and the CSP verifying the proof. To produce authentication tags for n blocks of the file F, each DO needs nH , nExp (or 2nExp for subsequent owners) and nMul operations, and the CSP further computes the authentication tags with nPair operations for each DO. To perform the POW process, the subsequent owner performs dExp + (d − 1)Mul to generate the ownership proof and the CSP needs dH + (2d + 1)Exp + 3dMul + 3Pair to verify the ownership proof. Assume that there are W + 1 data owners for the file F, the CSP will perform WnMul + WnPair to update the authentication tags to realize the authentication tag deduplication.
During the data integrity auditing phase, the computation costs mainly consist of two parts: the CSP generating the auditing proof and the TPA verifying the proof. In our CPDA scheme, the computational cost of generating the auditing proof for the CSP is (c + 2)Exp + (c + W − 2)Mul + 2Pair, and the computational cost to verify the proof for the TPA is cH + (c + 3)Exp + (c + 2)Mul + Pair. Now, we compare our CPDA scheme with the existing schemes [12] , [13] , [27] , [28] , and summarize the results in Table 5 , Table 6 and show them in Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and group to describe computation costs simply and effectively. In the POSD scheme in [12] , each entity (DO, CSP or TPA) needs to perform a large number of addition, multiplication, and exponentiation operations on an additive group, which creates huge computation overheads for each entity. Moreover, the computation costs are linear to the number of c and s during the POW verification and integrity auditing and it costs more to verify the proof than the other four schemes. In the SADD scheme in [27] , the computational cost is the largest among all the five schemes, since each entity (DO, CSP or TPA) needs to construct the MHT and the SADD involves more metadata than the other schemes. In the P-PCAD scheme in [28] , the POW process introduces 2nH + 2nExp + nMul + dPRF computation costs, and each owner needs (ns + n)H + 2nExp + nMul + nsPRF to generate the authentication tags, then it needs cExp+(c−1)Mul+cPair to generate the auditing proof and cH + (c + 2)Exp + cMul + Pair to verify the proof. In the PCAD scheme in [13] , the CSP costs little computation costs to verify the proof among five scheme as shown in Fig. 6 . However, the PCAD scheme needs more computation costs in storage phase and generating the proof than the other four schemes. Our CPDA scheme reduces the computation costs of generating the authentication tags for the data owner, because our scheme transferred a part of the calculation to the CSP who has rich computing resources. And our CPDA scheme needs lowest computation costs in the storage phase and generating the proof. To sum up, we can get a conclusion that our CPDA scheme is relatively computationally efficient during the storage phase and auditing phase.
C. STORAGE COSTS
In this section, the storage costs of above five schemes will be discussed and shown in Table 7 . In the SADD scheme, the storage costs mainly originate in the authentication tags and the metadata. Concretely, the storage costs for the tags and the metadata are n|G| and (2 log n+1 − 1) · |G| respectively, because there are 2 log n+1 −1 nodes in MHT. Thus, the SADD scheme needs more storage costs because it involves more metadata than other schemes. In the POSD scheme, the CSP only stores the authentication tags uploaded by the original owner. However, this will only allow the original DO audit the integrity of the file, which will greatly affect the practicality of this scheme. In order to overcome this shortcoming, the PCAD scheme, P-PCAD scheme and our CPDA scheme allow each DO to store his own authentication tags or signatures in the CSP. Nevertheless, in the P-PCAD scheme, the CSP directly store these authentication tags without further data processing and needs to store a bloom filter with ns k-bits pseudorandom values, which leads to a O(Wn) + O(ns) storage overheads. Fortunately, our CPDA scheme can reduce the storage overheads of the CSP about authentication tags to O(n) by aggregating authentication tags for the same block.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a confidentiality-preserving client-side deduplication cloud storage supporting public cloud auditing (CPDA) is put forward. Concretely, our CPDA scheme realizes the deduplication on an encrypted file by using content-identified convergent encryption technique which produces identical ciphertext file from identical plaintext file. In particular, the CPDA scheme can realize secure authentication tag deduplication by aggregating the authentication tags of the same blocks from different DOs. Moreover, the convergent encryption and random masking protect data confidentiality during the deduplication and integrity auditing processes in the CPDA scheme. Specifically, our CPDA scheme not only supports each DO to independently delegate the integrity auditing of their own files to the TPA, but also supports CSP to delegate TPA to batch audit the integrity of outsourced files periodically. Finally, we formally prove the security of our proposed scheme, and numerical analyses and experiment results demonstrate that our scheme is efficient by comparing with the stateof-the-art schemes on communication, computation and storage costs.
